ISLAMABAD / LONDON — Pakistan is running out of cash, Gulf partners are tightening the tap, and Field Marshal Asim Munir has been unable to secure a meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman despite repeated approaches, according to an investigative account that treats these developments as confirmed.
The picture that emerges is of a government that has exhausted easy bilateral support, is paying for a large overseas military deployment from its own strained budget, and is still chasing political and financial rescue from Riyadh that is no longer arriving on the old terms.
Empty coffers and a declined rollover
Pakistan’s fiscal position has deteriorated to the point that the state is described as “completely bare.” A Bloomberg report dated 3 September 2026 said Islamabad was seeking alternative funding after the United Arab Emirates declined to roll over a $3 billion loan, exposing the country’s dependence on public and bilateral financing.
That setback fits a longer pattern. Earlier in 2026 the UAE ended a years-long practice of rolling over deposits and pressed Pakistan to repay, forcing Islamabad to tap bond markets and other partners to cover obligations. Pakistan later raised $3 billion in a dual-tranche Eurobond sale, in part to manage repayments linked to Saudi and other facilities.
The investigative account contrasts this with the period under Imran Khan, when official data showed GDP growth near 6 percent, and argues that the April 2022 regime change and subsequent military-dominated politics wrecked that trajectory.
Munir cannot get in front of MBS
The most politically explosive claim is operational rather than macroeconomic: Munir’s secretariat has for more than two and a half weeks sought a meeting with MBS, including a request that the crown prince receive him on a private jet at Pakistan’s expense. MBS has not taken the meeting.
The reason given is straightforward: Pakistan has no money left to offer, and Saudi Arabia no longer sees the old “no money, no honey” bargain as worth the political cost. MBS last visited Pakistan during Khan’s tenure. Pakistani visa facilitation has also tightened amid irritation at what Riyadh views as chronic begging.
Troops in Saudi Arabia, dollars not arriving
Pakistan deployed a substantial force to Saudi Arabia during the Iran-related fighting in 2026 — thousands of troops, a fighter squadron (largely JF-17s), drones and an HQ-9 air-defence battery — under the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement signed in September 2025. Reuters and other outlets confirmed the scale of the deployment in May 2026.
The investigative version adds a cash problem the official statements omitted: salaries for the deployed troops are paid from Pakistan’s budget but denominated in dollars. Saudi Arabia is covering only basic maintenance costs and has refused extra funds. Arrears have built up. The Mecca defence understanding was expected to bring dollars, weapons and licences from Saudi Arabia and Türkiye; those extras have not materialised.
Saudi Arabia itself is running large deficits. Official 2026 budget documents project a deficit of about SAR 165 billion (roughly $44 billion), after a much larger shortfall in 2025. First-half 2026 figures showed a deficit of about $42.7 billion as spending outpaced revenue. Mega-projects have been scaled back and the kingdom has continued to borrow.
In that environment, Riyadh is not writing blank cheques for Islamabad.
The “London Plan” and a sectarian purge
The account traces Munir’s rise to a political bargain: the Sharif family guaranteed his appointment as army chief to the Saudi royal family under a “London Plan,” despite warnings about his alleged Iranian connections and unreliability.
It further alleges a systematic weeding-out of Shia officers and soldiers — who make up a large share of the force and of the intelligence services — as a signal to Riyadh and Washington. That claim, if accurate, would be one of the most serious internal-security stories of the year: a sectarian filter applied inside the army and ISI at a moment when Pakistan is simultaneously mediating regional conflict and sending troops to defend a Sunni monarchy.
The Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), sold as the vehicle that would bring $70–80 billion from the Gulf, has not delivered. The financing gap remains.
The political conclusion drawn from the facts
The report’s bottom line is that continued military management of politics since April 2022 is pushing Pakistan toward economic collapse and possible disintegration. The prescribed remedy is restoration of the electoral mandate associated with Imran Khan and an end to hybrid rule.
Whether that political prescription follows from the financial facts is a separate argument. The financial facts themselves — a refused UAE rollover, a large Saudi deployment funded in part from Pakistan’s own books, Saudi fiscal tightness, and a frantic search for new money — are already visible in public market and official reporting. The additional claims — MBS’s personal snub, the private-jet request, salary arrears, and a purge of Shia personnel — are the parts that, if independently confirmed, would turn a balance-of-payments story into a crisis of the command itself.
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