The press conference held by Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations (DG ISPR), on January 6, 2026, at General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, was a marathon affair—spanning over two hours and drawing a packed room of journalists, analysts, and military observers. The event felt chaotic at times, with a throng of media personnel jostling for questions amid a backdrop of heightened security tensions in Pakistan. This briefing came at a critical juncture, as Pakistan grapples with a resurgence of terrorism, particularly from groups operating out of Afghanistan.
The DG ISPR's tone was resolute, blending statistical data on counterterrorism operations with pointed geopolitical critiques, all while emphasizing Pakistan's sovereignty. It marked a significant moment where the military openly framed terrorists as "Fitna al-Khawarij"—a historical reference to extremist outcasts from Islam—and admitted a newfound clarity on their ideology, urging that every Pakistani child be educated on why these groups are "out of Islam."
The conference was not just a rundown of operations but a defensive narrative against external accusations, particularly from India and Afghanistan. It highlighted the terror networks in Afghanistan as a direct threat to Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity, echoing concerns that have simmered since the U.S. withdrawal in 2021. Lt Gen Chaudhry stressed that Pakistan's recent cross-border actions were strictly "hot pursuit" operations targeting Pakistani-origin terrorists, such as those affiliated with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), who have fled to Afghan sanctuaries. He clarified: "We went into Afghanistan in hot pursuit of Pakistani terrorists hiding there, not Afghans." This was positioned as a measured response to attacks on Pakistani soil, contrasting sharply with India's actions.
He drew a stark comparison, noting that India "came to kill Pakistani citizens, not Indian ones," in reference to alleged Indian operations like "Operation Sindoor," where India purportedly targeted civilians without providing evidence to Pakistan or a neutral third party. According to the DG, India's failure to substantiate claims of targeting its own citizens made their strikes an outright aggression against Pakistan, with no parallels to Pakistan's targeted pursuits against TTP hideouts. "There is no similarity between India's attack on Pakistan and our hot pursuit against TTP in Afghanistan," he asserted, underscoring that Pakistan's operations avoided broader escalation by not engaging Afghan forces directly.
The Q&A session was particularly lively—and crowded—with journalists firing pointed queries that exposed internal fissures. Veteran journalist Hamid Mir challenged the narrative on external backers: "If India is behind TTP, then who is behind IS-K or ISIS?" The DG's response was blunt, claiming a unified handler: "The handler is one, using IS-K or TTP interchangeably." This implied a coordinated proxy war, with India allegedly funnelling arms and funds to these groups.
Another highlight was Asma Shirazi's question on accountability for repatriating TTP militants: "Both civil and military leadership were involved in bringing back the TTP—why is only the civilian leadership guilty?" Lt Gen Chaudhry shifted the blame squarely to the civilian side, noting the prime minister at the time was "fully powerful," so much so that he controversially declared the Army Chief as the "father of the nation," overshadowing Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. This was at past political decisions critiqued appeasement policies, which the DG blamed for the current surge in attacks. The exchange revealed lingering tensions between military and civilian spheres, with the conference criticizing the PTI-led Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government's opposition to operations and failure to enforce the National Action Plan (NAP).
I contend that journalists Asma Shirazi and Hamid Mir overlook the essence of Pakistan's multifaceted challenges, including terrorism. These issues do not primarily stem from the civil-military schism but rather from a foundational flaw that permeates all spheres of Pakistani life—civil, military, and other loci of authority alike. This core problem originates in the founder's articulation of the modern state-society nexus, as expressed in his drafted address to the Constituent Assembly, wherein he posited that henceforth, no individual would be defined as Muslim or Hindu, but solely as Pakistani. Regrettably, this speech was subjected to censorship, precipitating the state's deviation from the quintessential tenets of modern citizenship toward a sectarian framework. Consequently, Pakistan now teeters on the brink of evolving into a bifurcated Sunni-Shia polity. This ideological trajectory, moreover, was imposed by the exigencies of the U.S.-led Cold War rather than arising from indigenous societal imperatives.
Statistically, the briefing painted a grim yet triumphant picture of Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts. In 2025 alone, security forces conducted 75,175 intelligence-based operations nationwide, killing 1,422 terrorists while suffering 311 military martyrs. Over 70% of incidents occurred in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, with Afghans involved in the majority of attacks—a sharp rise attributed to sanctuaries in Afghanistan housing up to 6,000 TTP fighters armed with abandoned U.S. weapons worth $7.2 billion.
The DG lambasted Afghanistan's interim government for failing Doha commitments, allowing groups like TTP, ISIS-K, and even Al-Qaeda to thrive, and warned of regional spill-over, including the influx of 2,500 Syrian terrorists. This data-driven approach lent credibility to the call for independent action, rejecting negotiations with "non-state actors" as a governance failure.
A standout admission was the military's "clarity" on the Khawarij ideology—the first public acknowledgment framing these terrorists as ideological deviants expelled from Islam. "We have now clarity about the Khawarij ideology, and every child of Pakistan must know that they are out of Islam," the DG stated, urging a national education drive. This term "Fitna al-Khawarij" draws from Islamic history, likening modern extremists to the 7th-century Kharijites who used religious pretexts for violence against fellow Muslims. It signals a shift from treating terrorism as mere criminality to a battle against perverted ideology, potentially galvanizing public support.
Deep Dive: History of Terrorism in Pakistan, Targeting Military Installations, and Perverted Religious Ideology
To fully appreciate the press conference's context, one must delve into Pakistan's two-decade struggle with terrorism, which has disproportionately targeted military installations and exploited distorted religious narratives. Terrorism in Pakistan escalated post-9/11, when U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan displaced militants across the border. The TTP, formed in 2007 under Baitullah Mehsud, emerged as a coalition of militant groups in the tribal areas, pledging allegiance to the Afghan Taliban but turning against the Pakistani state for its alliance with the West. TTP's ideology is rooted in a takfiri (excommunicating) interpretation of Deobandi Islam, declaring the Pakistani government apostate for "un-Islamic" policies. They pervert jihad as a holy war against the military, justifying attacks on schools, mosques, and bases as "revenge" against perceived oppression.
Key TTP attacks on military sites include the 2009 siege of the Pakistan Army's General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, where commandos stormed the facility, killing 11 soldiers and holding hostages for 20 hours. This was followed by the 2012 Kamra Airbase assault, damaging aircraft, and the 2014 Peshawar Army Public School massacre, killing 141 (mostly children)—a turning point that led to Operation Zarb-e-Azb. TTP's use of suicide bombers, often indoctrinated youth, frames these as "martyrdom operations" in a twisted religious lens, drawing from Salafi-jihadist texts that misinterpret Quranic verses on warfare.
ISIS-K (Islamic State Khorasan Province), established in 2015 as ISIS's South Asian affiliate, added another layer. Comprising defectors from TTP and Afghan Taliban, ISIS-K adopts an even more extreme Salafi-jihadist ideology, viewing Shia Muslims, Sufis, and state forces as infidels. Their attacks target military and civilians alike, using religion to recruit via online propaganda glorifying a "caliphate." Notable strikes include the 2018 Mastung bombing killing 149 (including security personnel), the 2022 Peshawar mosque suicide attack killing 63 during prayers, and the 2021 Quetta Serena Hotel bombing aimed at Chinese interests but hitting military escorts. ISIS-K's survival post-Taliban takeover in Afghanistan has been fueled by rivalries, allowing them to stage cross-border operations. Both groups exploit poverty and madrasas for recruitment, perverting Islamic teachings on justice into calls for sectarian violence.
Pakistan's response evolved from kinetic operations like Zarb-e-Azb (2014–2016), which cleared North Waziristan of militants, to the NAP in 2015, focusing on deradicalization and madrasa reforms. However, resurgence post-2021 U.S. withdrawal— with TTP regrouping in Afghanistan—has seen over 1,000 attacks annually, targeting bases like the 2023 Mianwali Airbase assault. The DG's Khawarij framing counters this by religiously delegitimizing them, akin to how Saudi Arabia denounced Al-Qaeda.
Overall, the press conference was a robust, if overcrowded, assertion of Pakistan's stance—blending defiance against external threats with internal calls for unity. While it provided clarity on ideological battles, critics might argue it glossed over shared civil-military responsibilities. In a nation scarred by over 80,000 terrorism deaths since 2001, such briefings are vital, but sustained NAP implementation remains the litmus test for success.
No comments:
Post a Comment